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In this article, we discuss the current state of Alternative Dispute Resolution (‘ADR’)
law, practice and education in South Africa, with a particular focus on the potential role for
mediation in commercial disputes. Our angle is to frame the material with a discussion of
economic and contract theory, particularly that on private ordering and relational
contracting. We link this socio-legal theory to more specific theory on ADR itself, and
then contextualise ADR in South Africa. We discuss the role of ADR in commercial
practice generally and provide a detailed account of the South African construction industry
specifically. Our major conclusion is that ADR is often the most appropriate form of
dispute resolution, particularly where social capital is at stake. This provides the link
between ADR theory and private ordering/relational theory. Another important
conclusion is that South Africa needs more specialist mediators, as well as a legal and
political environment which incentivises such training.
I INTRODUCTION
The evidence suggests that alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) is on the
rise in the SouthAfrican commercial sector. ADR, of course, has been a firm
fixture of SouthAfrican employment law for many years.1 It is also coming to
the fore in modern consumer legislation, whether through the National
Consumer Tribunal,2 the Rental Housing Tribunal,3 or the various industry
ombuds.4 Even in the sector of blue-chip commercial work, arbitration
clauses are very common — perhaps even the norm — in commercial
* This work is based on research supported by the National Research Founda-
tion (‘NRF’) (grant number 10989). Any opinion, finding and conclusion, or
recommendation expressed in this material is that of the authors and the NRF does
not accept any liability in this regard.
1 This is the role of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation andArbitration
(‘CCMA’), set up under the LabourRelationsAct 66 of 1995.
2 The National Consumer Tribunal is mentioned as a forum for dispute resolu-
tion in both the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and the National Credit Act
34 of 2005. OnADR in the consumer law sphere, see generally Tanya Woker ‘Con-
sumer protection and alternative dispute resolution’ (2016) 28 SA Merc LJ 21.
3 This forum determines disputes related to residential leases as a preliminary step
before formal litigation under the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999. See further
Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA531 (CC).
4 Insurance (both the long-term and short-term insurance industries separately),
banking and financial services (generally) are examples of industries that have dedi-
cated ombuds set up by statute. There is also a general Consumer Goods and Services
Ombud.
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contracts drafted by South African law firms,5 while the current King Code
of Corporate Governance touts mediation as the recommended format for
corporate dispute resolution.6 Legal scholarship in South Africa is also
showing a renewed interest in ADR. One need only browse recent editions
of our leading law journals,7 or the catalogues of our leading law publishers,8
to confirm this. Similarly, ADR courses at the University of Cape Town,
where two of the authors are based, are always fully subscribed, demonstrat-
ing student and practitioner interest in acquiringADR-related skills.9
The reasons for this trend are not hard to find. Curial adjudication involves
a lengthy wait for a trial date, exacerbated by heavy legal fees. Aside from
time and money, other business reasons may point to ADR as not just being
the ‘alternative’, but perhaps also the ‘appropriate’ form of dispute resolution,
particularly where a valuable business relationship or confidential informa-
tion is involved. Of course, there are those who argue against settlement and
ADR in general — legal and moral arguments can be raised against the
privatisation of dispute resolution.10 While noting the importance of some of
this criticism, our aim is to contextualise our argument. Rather than a blunt,
reductive argument against adversarial public litigation, we will use (inter
alia) socio-legal theory, comparative scholarship11 and, in Michelle Wright
and Alan Rycroft’s cases, personal experience to answer anti-ADR com-
5 Compare the general trend of the underlying narrative in P M Nienaber
‘Toegepaste reg oor arbitrasies en dies meer’ (2016) 27 Stellenbosch LR 393.
6 The King III Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2009) included a ch 11
on alternative dispute resolution. This position is maintained in the King IV Report on
Corporate Governance for South Africa (2016).
7 Nienaber op cit note 5; Woker op cit note 2; F D J Brand ‘Judicial review of
arbitration awards’ (2014) 25 Stellenbosch LR 247; Ronan Feehily ‘The certainty of
settlement’ (2016) 27 Stellenbosch LR 25; Ronan Feehily ‘The role of the commercial
mediator in the mediation process:A critical analysis of the legal and regulatory issues’
(2015) 132 SALJ 372; Alan Rycroft ‘What should the consequences be of an unrea-
sonable refusal to participate inADR?’ (2014) 131 SALJ 778.
8 John Brand, Felicity Steadman & Christopher Todd Commercial Mediation:
A User’s Guide (2012); P Ramsden The Law of Arbitration (2009); Paul Pretorius (ed)
Dispute Resolution (1993); T Wiese Alternative Dispute Resolution in South Africa: Nego-
tiation, Mediation, Arbitration and Ombudsmen (2016); E Patelia & MAChicktay Appro-
priate Dispute Resolution: A Practical Guide to Negotiation, Mediation & Arbitration (2015);
C G Marnewick Mediation Practice in the Magistrates’Courts (2015); Laurence Boulle &
AlanRycroft Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1997).
9 The University of Cape Town offers a final year LLB elective in Dispute Reso-
lution as well as separate LLM courses in Negotiation, Mediation and Commercial
Arbitration. The UCT Law@Work programme (aimed at professionals) offers a
quarterly certificate course in Commercial and Court-Aligned Mediation in con-
junction with Mediation in Motion, an NPO promoting mediation training and
services.
10 Most famously, Owen Fiss ‘Against settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1073.
11 There are several key comparative collections on ADR: Arnold Ingen-Housz
(ed) ADR in Business: Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures Vol 2 (2011);
Klaus J Hopt & Felix Steffek Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspec-
tive (2013); Felix Steffek (ed) Regulating Dispute Resolution (2013).
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plaints within our frame of reference. Our primary focus will be on
negotiated forms of settlement in a commercial context. (We will not touch
on private ordering in African customary law, including in contractual
exchanges.12) Such negotiation may be directly party-to-party or through a
mediator. Of course, much of what we deal with below could also apply
mutatis mutandis to more adjudicative ADR processes, such as arbitration.
Our inquiry will proceed as follows: in part II, we will give an account of
the law-and-society literature on contracting with reference to dispute
resolution. In particular, we aim to highlight a phenomenon known as
‘private ordering’ or ‘order without law’, in terms of which relationships,
including commercial relationships, can be adequately (and perhaps even
successfully) managed without direct recourse to adjudication through the
courts. This is for two reasons — first, the relational dimension of business
contracts; and secondly, the transaction costs involved in the enforcement of
contracts through the courts. We will analyse the theoretical and empirical
authorities supporting these arguments.
In part III, we will review the trend towards private dispute resolution in
South Africa, both descriptively and normatively. As stated above, we will
comment particularly on the role of negotiation and mediation in this regard,
and the potential which these forms of ADR have to facilitate private
ordering in commercial transactions. We will also explore the arguments for
and against out-of-court settlement of disputes.
Part IV will contextualise our preceding arguments to give a law-in-action
account of settlement ADR in the construction industry in South Africa.
Michelle Porter-Wright is a director at a Johannesburg law firm dealing
specifically with construction industry dispute resolution. This article will
rely on her personal experiences in practice as a benchmark against which to
test the arguments of parts II and III.
We will conclude the analysis in part V with an evaluation of the
congruence between the private ordering literature and the ADR trend in
South Africa.
II PRIVATE ORDERING
In this part of our article, we will defend aspects of the law-and-society
literature, as well as a particular strand of economic theory, on contracting.
Particularly, we will focus on scholarly trends which could be collected under
the heading ‘relational contract theory’, which includes our central concern,
12 For mainstreamADR literature which touches on the theme ofAfrican customs
or customary law, see R B G Choudree ‘Traditions of conflict resolution in South
Africa’ (1999) 1 African Journal on Conflict Resolution accessible at www.accord.org.za;
John Brand ‘Amicable dispute resolution in SouthAfrica’ inArnold Ingen-Housz (ed)
ADR in Business: Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures Vol 2 (2011) 591;
Kenny Aina ‘Amicable dispute resolution: The Nigerian experience’ in Arnold
Ingen-Housz (ed) op cit at 601; Amadou Dieng ‘ADR in sub-SaharanAfrican coun-
tries’ inArnold Ingen-Housz (ed) op cit at 611.
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‘private ordering’. We justify our focus on contract theory in an article on
ADR with reference to the commercial context of our argument (business
relationships rest on contracting, as indeed does ADR), and the fact that
much of our focus in the subsequent parts below will be on motivating for
the economic and relationship-preserving advantages of ADR. Hence the
link between relational contract theory’s insights and the ADR movement
will become apparent as our argument develops.
(a) Relational contracting
Relational contract theory describes the organic business relationship that
exists between contracting parties who do repeat business with each other —
the given transaction is analysed as one embedded in a broader social
milieu.13 A once-off (‘discrete’) contract, although the model for conven-
tional legal analysis, is a business rarity. Even if a given contract involves a
one-time cash-on-delivery exchange, if the market in which that exchange
takes place rewards contracting parties for having a sound reputation, there
will be broader dimensions to the transaction than just the specified terms.
This is what Macneil terms ‘contractual relations’, in the sense that parties
who do repeat business, or who rely on a marketable reputation, need to
manage their relationships with contracting counterparts.14 In a context
where the contract is intended to endure over a long period of time, or
where the parties will enter into multiple repeat transactions, the importance
of the business relationship is all the more acute. Relational contract theory
hence contextualises a contractual transaction within the setting of underly-
ing economic interests, as well as social factors, such as inter-personal
connections between the parties.15 The literature on this topic talks of joint
welfare maximisation through co-operation rather than competition;
13 The literature is fairly extensive. By way of introduction, see the essays collected
in David Campbell (ed) The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil
(2001); Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William C Whitford (eds) Revisiting the Con-
tracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (2013); David Campbell, Linda Mulcahy & Sally
Wheeler (eds) Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (2016).
For a SouthAfrican perspective, see Luanda Hawthorne ‘Relational contract theory:
Is the antagonism directed at discrete exchanges and presentiation justified?’ in Gra-
ham Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 137 and ‘The first traces of
relational contract theory — The implicit dimension of co-operation’ (2007) 19 SA
Merc LJ 234; Tamara Cohen ‘Implying fairness into the employment contract’ (2009)
30 ILJ 2271; Tamara Cohen ‘The relational contract of employment’ 2012 Acta
Juridica 84.
14 These ideas are central to Macneil’s work on relational contracts. See by way of
example Ian R Macneil ‘The many futures of contracts’ (1974) 47 Southern California
LR 691 and Ian R Macneil The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual
Relations (1980).
15 This is a central element of the argument in Hugh Collins Regulating Contracts
(1999) chs 5 & 6.
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through seeking mutually profitable engagements where the parties’ eco-
nomic interests intersect; and through building trust through reciprocity.16
Empirically, these ideas make sound business sense, at least to the present
authors. Trust, the bedrock of co-operation, is built up between contracting
parties, leading to mutual benefit.17 Relational contract theory is comfortable
and easily defensible within a living contractual relationship, while the
relations between the parties remain healthy. Relational contract theory
however, is not comfortable in an adversarial setting once the business
relationship breaks down.18 This is perhaps why relational contract theory is
more popular amongst businesspersons than lawyers — once a relationship is
broken, a legal dispute is more likely to turn on concrete rights than on
norms of practice. If trust and reciprocity have been destroyed and amicable
solutions are no longer possible, formal litigation (and possibly other forms of
adjudication) will result in a win/lose situation once the chosen tribunal
makes its decision. Here disputes are usually determined by an interpretation
of the actual written contract and the rights created therein. In this type of
approach, relational contract theory is not an easy fit, although Macneil did
describe a trend in the United States towards a ‘neo-classical’ contract law,
which contained more room for context-sensitive flexible standards and
discretionary adjudication.19 It appears that South African contract law may
also be moving increasingly towards this path under our Constitutional
Court’s direction.20
Thus, the conclusion to draw here is that while most contractual situations
are relational, contract law is (largely) not. Also, litigation is likely to destroy a
contractual relationship, so this avenue should only be entertained where the
business relationship is no longer worth preserving. This leads logically to the
proposition that party-to-party negotiation, or even third-party facilitated
negotiation in the form of mediation, offers relationship-preserving potential
for managing conflict or resolving disputes.
(b) Transaction cost economics
Transaction cost economics, a branch of the new institutional economics,21 is
the strand of economic theory most closely associated with relational
16 See the sources cited in note 13 above. See in particular David Campbell ‘Ian
Macneil and the relational theory of contract’ in Campbell (ed) op cit note 13 at 3.
17 For a brief explanation, see David Campbell ‘What do we mean by the non-use
of contract?’ in Braucher et al (eds) op cit note 13 at 164.
18 Compare JonathanMorgan Contract Law Minimalism (2013) at 103–8.
19 For a discussion of the differences between ‘classical’, ‘neo-classical’ and ‘rela-
tional’ contract law, see Ian Macneil ‘Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic
relations under classical, neo-classical and relational contract law’ (1978) 72 Northwest-
ern Univ LR 854. For an argument as to how this relates to the SouthAfrican context,
see Andrew Hutchison ‘Relational theory, context and commercial common sense:
Views on contract interpretation and adjudication’ (2017) 134 SALJ 296.
20 This is the argument advanced inHutchison ibid.
21 For a more recent collection of essays, see Claude Ménard & Mary M Shirley
(eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics (2005).
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contracting.22 The basic proposition behind transaction cost economics, as
Williamson explains, is that transactions generate costs, similar to the concept
of friction in physics.23 This is a factor to be considered in framing an
economic organisation; structuring a transaction ex ante; or enforcing a
contract ex post.24 For example, in a contractual relation which is intended to
last for a lengthy period of time, is it worth the costs involved to negotiate
and draft a detailed written contract which provides for every possible
instance? To the extent that this is even possible (compare Macneil’s
discussion of predicting the future at the time of contract drafting —
‘presentiation’),25 such discussions may signal perceived bad faith to a
counterpart, or simply involve costs in time and money which are not worth
incurring. Similarly, when it comes to contract enforcement, it may be that
the costs of engaging legal representation, the delay in getting a court date,
the time spent preparing for and conducting litigation, followed (even if
successful) by the difficulties of execution of a court order, outweigh the cost
of simply bearing the loss in question, (possibly) writing it off as a
tax-deductible expense, and resolving never to do business with that
particular counterpart again. In an organisational setting, questions may arise
as to whether a supply chain is best managed by vertical integration, or by
relational contracting, such as in a contractual network.26 The emergent
picture is that while contract law and the legal rights it creates may be
perfectly valid on paper, economic factors may make those rights worthless
to a particular party in the context of its given business dispute. The key
component of the analysis is predicting what are the costs of doing business in
a particular way.
A related empirical discussion can be found in the work of Macaulay,
whose interviews in various contracting sectors suggested that there is a
difference between ‘the real deal’ and ‘the paper deal’, or that business often
involves a ‘non-contractual relation’.27 The general idea is that businessper-
sons will resort to legal representation, or litigation, only as an absolute last
straw. The reason for this is clear: involving lawyers is bad for business as it
destroys valuable commercial relationships.ApplyingWilliamson’s analysis to
Macaulay’s ‘non-use’of contracts, one might say that legal representation and
22 See especially the work of Oliver E Williamson, such as The Economic Institutions
of Capitalism (1985).
23 Williamson ibid at 19.
24 Ibid at 20–2.
25 This concept is (again) central to Macneil’s work. See the sources mentioned in
note 14 above.
26 Williamson op cit note 22; W W Powell ‘Neither market nor hierarchy: Net-
work forms of organization’ (1990) 12 Research in Organizational Behavior 295;
Marc Amstutz & Guenther Teubner (eds) Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral
Co-operation (2009).
27 See in particular Stewart Macaulay ‘Non-contractual relations in business — A
preliminary study’ (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 55. Further examples of
Macaulay’s work and secondary essays thereon can be found in Braucher et al (eds)
op cit note 13.
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litigation increase the transaction costs in a particular contract or contractual
dispute, which should hence be avoided if the goal is to make a profit or build
a reputation.
From an ADR point of view, the connection here is to the common
arguments in favour of ADR, namely that it typically costs less in terms of
legal representation (certainly this is the case for negotiation or mediation,
but even adjudicative forms of ADR can result in savings of time and
money), with additional payoffs, such as confidentiality. In addition, business
relationships cost time and money to build — the loss of these could
potentially be a heavy transaction cost of litigated dispute resolution.
(c) Non-legal sanctions
What then is the substitute for limiting or punishing recalcitrant or bad-faith
behaviour through the courts? The answer is that if formal legal dispute
resolution is to be avoided, there must be some other method for ensuring a
counterpart’s compliance with contractual expectations. The answer pro-
posed by the socio-legal literature is that this is a normal process of human
socialisation, resting on non-legal or economic sanctions.28 In his seminal
article on this topic, Charny suggests that compliance with commercial
norms is achieved through three means. First, there is the fact that parties may
have a mutual desire to do repeat business with each other. If there is
non-compliance, future possibilities for exchange may be more limited or
even no longer available, with economic repercussions. Secondly, in a
market where participants are known to one another, or where information
is available through formal or social media, a business reputation (or
goodwill) is a tangible economic asset, which negative gossip, bad press, or
public litigation may damage, thereby reducing its value.29 Hence a party to a
contractual relationship has a reputational interest in complying with
established norms. Thirdly, (and possibly more intangibly) there is the forum
of conscience, where personal honour or guilt may motivate a contracting
party to adhere to accepted standards.30 The net result of these factors is that
economic pressure can be brought to bear on a counterpart through
28 Most famously David Charny ‘Nonlegal sanctions in commercial relationships’
(1990–1991) 104 Harvard LR 373. See further Collins op cit note 15 at ch 5.
29 These reputational and ethical considerations are captured in Michael Wheeler
‘5 principles of negotiation to boost your bargaining skills in business situations’
(2016) Program on Negotiation — Harvard Law School, who argues that there are five
considerations which underlie ethical business contracts: reciprocity, publicity, the
trusted friend, universality and legacy, each drawn from the following questions:
‘Would I want others to treat me or someone close to me this way? Would I be
comfortable if my actions were fully and fairly described in the newspaper? Would I
be comfortable telling my best friend, spouse, or children what I am doing? Would
I advise anyone else in my situation to act this way? Does this action reflect how I
want to be known and remembered?’Available at https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/
negotiation-training-daily/questions-of-ethics-in-negotiation/, accessed on 24 February
2017.
30 These are the three suggestions put forward by Charny op cit note 28 at 392–7.
(2018) 135 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL330
relational means. Of course, what is not mentioned here are more conven-
tional forms of leverage, described in the economic literature as ‘hostages’ or
‘collateral’,31 where valuable items are held by one party by agreement in
order to compel performance by a counterpart without requiring a resort to
the courts. Deposits, liens and other rights of security, and more subtle forms
of coercion relying on market power or influence, all fall into this category.
These would usually fall under the description ‘self-help’. Where such
self-help happens without the need for court enforcement, arguably we are
dealing with a ‘non-legal’ sanction.32 (Some such measures will be lawful,
others unlawful — this is a question largely of public policy.33)
The potential of non-legal sanctions can be fully explored inADR, both in
terms of facilitating or framing negotiations, or in forcing settlement. This
may result in the more powerful party leveraging its market power, but could
also level the playing field, such as when a consumer relies on the
reputational concerns of a large supplier to ensure compliance. In the sense
thatADR allows for a broader spectrum of party-to-party solutions, as well as
confidentiality, there may be greater individual control over reputational
damage, as well as a possibility to preserve repeat business. In a consumer
setting, the avoidance of litigation costs often makes non-legal sanctions the
only realistic form of ensuring compliance with contracts. Non-legal
sanctions may hence be a motivating factor in the choice ofADR as a dispute
resolution method or to facilitate an out-of-court settlement.
(d) Order without law34
The literature on private ordering includes some extremely influential
empirical studies emanating largely from the United States,35 but also
31 Williamson op cit note 22 ch 7.
32 Self-help can however result in less-than-honest responses, which have been
justified as a defence strategy (as in self-defence) and has been called ‘defensive dis-
honesty’, a way to limit risk. Dees & Cramton call this the Mutual Trust Principle,
which says: ‘Obligations to refrain from specific kinds of morally regrettable conduct
are diminished (perhaps eliminated) for an individual when the following two condi-
tions are present: (1) the individual is operating in a trust-deficient social context, and
(2) refraining from the regrettable conduct would cause the individual to bear signifi-
cant incremental risks or incur significant incremental costs.’ See J G Dees &
P C Cramton ‘Shrewd bargaining on the moral frontier: Toward a theory of morality
in practice’ (1991) Business Ethics Quarterly 135; see also J G Dees & P C Cramton
‘Promoting honesty in negotiation: An exercise in practical ethics’ 1993 Business
Ethics Quarterly 4.
33 Compare the literature on summary execution against property held under an
agreement of pledge (‘parate executie’clauses).
34 For an overview of the ‘private ordering’ literature, see Barak D Richman
‘Firms, courts and reputation mechanisms: Towards a positive theory of private
ordering’ (2004) 104 Columbia LR 2328.
35 See for present purposes Robert C Ellickson Order Without Law: How Neighbors
Settle Disputes (1991); Lisa Bernstein ‘Opting out of the legal system: Extralegal con-
tractual relations in the diamond industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115; Lisa
Bernstein ‘Merchant law in a merchant court: Rethinking the code’s search for
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elsewhere.36 The genre of this writing is broadly law and society, in some
cases with a fairly pronounced economic analysis. As above, the hypothesis is
that unlike Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan,37 in the absence of a recourse to
formal, centralised law, society will not necessarily descend into a hostile and
anarchic state of nature, but will rather self-regulate, through the imposition
of non-legal norms and standards enforced by society itself, rather than by the
state.38 (There is of course an overlap with the concept of ‘legal pluralism’
here, which also defends a view that ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ have
normative force, creating binding customs outside of centralised law.39 We
have chosen to retain the terminology of ‘private ordering’ as we think that
this terminology works better for our analogy to ADR. In addition, our
argument is one largely based on economic interests — since this is not law,
we do not motivate for recognition of a parallel legal system.)
In the interests of brevity, this article will mention the work of just three
scholars. From a US perspective, Ellickson described the norms of a
community of cattle ranchers located in Shasta County, California.40 Ellick-
son’s empirical study, which involved interviewing members of this commu-
nity, found that non-legal norms governed issues like who was responsible
for building and maintaining a common boundary fence; how to prevent
cattle roaming off an owner’s land; or who was liable if a stray cow caused a
motor vehicle accident.41 Conflict or disputes over this type of issue were
resolved through the application of unwritten social conventions, backed up
by non-legal sanctions.42 Community members did not resort to the formal
law or legal structures when faced with this type of situation.43 Similarly,
immanent business norms’ (1995–1996) 144 Univ of Pennsylvania LR 1765; Lisa Bern-
stein ‘Private commercial law in the cotton industry: Creating cooperation through
rules, norms and institutions’ (2000–2001) 99 Michigan LR 1724.
36 We refer here to Marcel Fafchamps ‘The enforcement of commercial contracts
in Ghana’ (1996) 24 World Development 427. Other developing world examples exist:
see the overview inRichman op cit note 34.
37 ThomasHobbes Leviathan (1651).
38 See the sources in notes 34–6 above. The Leviathan idea is discussed in (for
example) Williamson op cit note 22 at 164–6 and recurrently in Ellickson op cit note
35.
39 For the concept of ‘legal pluralism’ in South Africa, see Chuma Himonga &
Thandabantu Nhlapo (eds) African Customary Law in South Africa: Post-Apartheid and
Living Law Perspectives (2014) 45; T W Bennett ‘African customary law’ in Matthias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law
(2006) 641 at 666–71. For the world literature, see (ex pluribus) John Griffiths ‘What
is legal pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1; Sally Engle
Merry ‘Legal pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869. For the concept of a
‘semi-autonomous social field’, see Sally Falk Moore ‘Law and social change:
The semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study’ (1972–1973) 7
Law and Society Review 719.
40 Ellickson op cit note 35.
41 Ibid; see in particular part I of this work for the empirical findings.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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Bernstein conducted several separate empirical studies of specific industries
in the US in the course of her published research. She conducted influential
investigations into the New York diamond industry;44 the largely South-
Eastern US cotton industry;45 and the US national grain industry.46 In each
case, she found a system with repeat players, which operated according to
industry norms and customs. In all cases there were industry specific rules,
not captured in formal legal sources, which were enforced either by
non-legal sanctions, or by independent dispute resolution tribunals (or both).
To give an African equivalent, Fafchamps described the privately ordered
nature of Ghanaian commercial enterprise in the manufacturing and trading
sectors.47 He was able to derive therefrom broader conclusions about how
Ghanaian commercial practice could be enhanced by structural and regula-
tory developments, such as by the introduction of a small claims court and
national credit bureaux.48 Fafchamps’s findings similarly confirm that in the
absence of recourse to (or availability of) formal legal mechanisms, economic
considerations would govern commercial practice, resulting in a privately
ordered marketplace.
Although the communities described by Ellickson, Bernstein and Faf-
champs were largely homogeneous and established, it is interesting to see that
in these communities of merchants (in Bernstein’s and Fafchamps’s cases), or
commercial farmers (in Ellickson’s case), business was conducted according
to a private commercial code of normative conduct, which was outside of
formal law. The conclusions derived by these authors were largely of the
law-and-economics variety, centring on themes such as co-operation versus
competition, the effectiveness of non-legal sanctions, and hence the efficacy
of a privately ordered system. While other scholars have pointed out that the
homogeneity of the communities in question may have facilitated private
ordering, the incongruence with the state-of-nature hypothesis is striking.49
It would thus seem that in the absence of law, economics rules the market
place and will fill regulatory gaps in the system. From the perspective of
relational contract theory, where a contract is a three-dimensional construc-
tion of the specific agreed transaction, the supervening business relationship,
and the underlying economic interests of both parties, we see that the
relational and economic dimensions of a transaction are capable of governing
it in the absence of enforceable law.50 This is the essence of private ordering.
44 Bernstein 1992 Journal of Legal Studies op cit note 35.
45 Bernstein 1996 Univ of Pennsylvania op cit note 35.
46 Bernstein 2001 Michigan LR op cit note 35.
47 Fafchamps op cit note 36.
48 Ibid at 443–6.
49 This idea is central to the argument of Richman op cit note 34.
50 For the idea of a three-dimensional analysis of contracts, see Collins op cit note
15; Hugh Collins ‘The contract of employment in 3D’ in Campbell et al (eds) op cit
note 13 at 65.
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(e) Comment: Private ordering and ADR
As has been suggested above, relational contract theory, transaction cost
economics and non-legal sanctions are all firmly compatible with ADR.
Possibly this type of analysis is more at home in negotiated forms of ADR,
particularly those aimed at settlement. As argued in the preceding sub-part,
however, privately ordered systems, such as those described by Bernstein in
particular, may also operate in the setting of adjudicative forms of ADR. The
point is that dispute resolution is privatised and managed entirely by the
parties to the transaction, either individually, or as members of a community
or group. Private ordering theory is hence a good fit for ADR, with all the
relational advantages of preserving commercial partnerships51 and net-
works;52 allowing creative settlements which ‘grow the pie’ toward a
mutually profitable outcome;53 ensuring the ability to bring market pressure
to bear on a party to facilitate an economically realistic settlement; and, most
importantly, creating the ability to maintain control over proceedings in
terms of time, costs incurred, confidentiality, whether the settlement is
binding or not, the nature of the forum and the identity of the decision-
maker.
III ADR IN SOUTH AFRICA
(a) South African ADR processes and relationship preservation
Before commenting on the present status of mediation practice in South
Africa, it is worth considering the link between the relational contract and
ADR processes. In fact the relational focus of mediation is regarded as one of
its central advantages.As has been pointed out:
‘Besides being person-centred, mediation also has a relational focus. This
signifies that its methods and philosophy are concerned with the human side of
dispute resolution, including the opportunity for the venting of emotions,
acknowledgment of strongly-held feelings and attention to future relations
between the parties. Mediation can preserve or improve relationships by taking
into account the real interests of the parties, by providing an accessible and
participatory procedure, by modelling constructive negotiation and problem-
solving techniques and by humanising the management of conflict. This
51 For a construction industry perspective on the advantages of a ‘partnering’
approach, see M Latham ‘Constructing the Team: Final Report of the Government/
Industry Review of Procurement and Construction Arrangements in the UK Con-
struction Industry’ (1994), available at http://constructingexcellence.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/Constructing-the-team-The-Latham-Report.pdf, accessedon30November
2016; J Egan ‘Rethinking Construction: Report of the Construction Task Force to
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott’ (1997), available at http://constructingexcellence.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/rethinking_construction_report.pdf,accessedon30Novem-
ber 2016.
52 See the sources cited in note 26 above.
53 This phrase (and the general idea) is taken from Roger Fisher, William Ury &
Bruce Patton Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In (2011 [original
ed 1981]) especially in ch 4.
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constitutes the ‘‘gentler art’’ of reconciliation, rather than the confrontationist
science of court battle.’54
Apart from these reasons, mediation is often chosen when adverse
publicity must be avoided and/or a confidential process is required.55 Other
factors supporting a non-adversarial process are the following:56
(i) when there are no great issues of principle or policy involved;
(ii) when there is the time, resources and commitment to negotiate a
mutually satisfactory agreement;
(iiii) when the level of conflict between the parties is moderate;
(iv) when there is a rough equality of bargaining power between the
parties;
(v) when the parties have the capacity and abilities to negotiate;
(vi) when there is more than a single issue in dispute;
(vii) when there are no clear legal principles or other standards to guide the
parties’ decision-making; and
(viii) when there is some external or institutional encouragement for the
parties to settle in mediation.
In contrast, arbitration is chosen:57
(i) when negotiation and/or conciliation has failed;
(ii) when there is an agreement or statute which requires arbitration;
(iii) when either party feels there is an important issue of principle involved
that requires a definitive ruling;
(iv) when either party wants to take a stand on the issue;
(v) when the dispute involves a purely legal question;
(vi) when the dispute cannot be resolved without making complicated
findings of fact;
(vii) when either party wants a definitive ruling on an existing policy
affecting many people;
(viii) when an individual feels pressurised/disempowered in the conciliation
process and wants a third party to make a ruling; and
(ix) when a party is confident about the level of skill of its representative in
arguing the case.
These factors echo the concerns of Fiss over settlement as a norm for
dispute resolution in terms of power imbalances, the possible absence of
authoritative consent and the lack of a foundation for continuing judicial
involvement.58 Fiss asserted that judges and courts are society’s chosen way of
resolving disputes, ‘to explicate and give force to the values embodied in
54 Boulle &Rycroft op cit note 8 at 37.
55 Lawrence Freedman & Michael Prigoff ‘Confidentiality in mediation: The need
for protection’ (1986–1987) 2 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 37–45.
56 Compare John Brand, Casper Lötter, Carl Mischke & Felicity Steadman Labour
Dispute Resolution (1997) 78.
57 Patelia &Chicktay Appropriate Dispute Resolution op cit note 8 at 59.
58 Fiss op cit note 10.
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authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those
values and to bring reality into accord with them. This duty is not discharged
when parties settle.’59 The argument is that settlement deprives a court of the
opportunity to create precedent to guide the resolution of other disputes.60
We concede that there will always be disputes where the public interest
requires court adjudication. But our concern is narrower — disputes
between parties in an established relationship where there is no public
interest in the settlement.
There has been an attempt to integrate the mediation and arbitration
processes in the med-arb and arb-med processes. Med-arb (also known as
‘con-arb’) is the process in which a third party attempts, through mediation,
to help parties to a dispute to reach a settlement; but, if this is not possible, to
then determine the dispute by making a final and binding arbitral award.61
This process is generally seen as an efficient hybrid process which offers the
best of both worlds — the opportunity for the parties to reach their own
settlement, failing which the parties have the finality of an arbitral award. In
the event that mediation fails, the parties need not educate another third
party; the person who has been serving as mediator knows much of the
information he or she will need to make a decision.62 Objections to med-arb
are usually based on an understanding of the mediation process, which
requires frank disclosure and confidentiality as key components to the
successful resolution of disputes. These components would be withheld, it is
argued, if the parties know in advance that the mediator could later arbitrate
the dispute.63 Arbitration requires that justice is seen to be done. How then
does the arbitrator retain the image of impartiality after having indicated
possible weaknesses in a party’s case during the mediation phase? How does
the arbitrator make a decision, on the evidence in the arbitration, having
given indications during the reality testing portion of the mediation phase of
possible limitations in the position of one or other party?
To deal with these problems, a variation was developed. Arb-med (or
‘Arb-con’) is a process by which the parties to a dispute agree to go to a single
third party who first arbitrates but does not disclose the determination to the
parties. With the determination sealed in an envelope and not subject to
59 Ibid at 1085.
60 The American Bar Association drew attention to some of these problems in its
2003 ‘Vanishing trial project’. See http://www.abanet.org/litigation/journal/opening_
statements/04winter_openingstatement.pdf, accessed on 16March 2017.
61 Barry Bartel ‘Med-Arb as a distinct method of dispute resolution: History,
analysis, and potential’ (1991) 27 Williamette LR 661; Brand et al op cit note 56;
Camilla Leeds &Albert Wocke ‘Methods of reducing the referral of frivolous cases to
the CCMA’ (2009) 33 Journal of Labour Relations 28; J A Faris ‘Exploring the alterna-
tives in alternative dispute resolution’ (1994) 27 De Jure 331; Barney Jordaan ‘Hybrid
ADR processes in South Africa’ (2011) 9 ADR Bulletin available at http://
epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol12/iss5/2/, accessed on 16March 2017.
62 Stephen Goldberg, Frank Sander & Nancy Rogers Dispute Resolution 2 ed
(1992) 226.
63 AlanRycroft ‘Rethinking the con-arb procedure’ (2003) 24 ILJ 699.
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alteration, the third party then conciliates the dispute. Failing settlement in
the conciliation, the determination is disclosed to the parties and becomes
binding upon them.64
Both these processes offer ways to tackle matters which do not settle in
mediation but where the relational aspects of the contract require a ‘softer’
process than litigation. Certainly the arbitration phase in both med-arb and in
arb-med contains the risk of a damage to the relationship, but in both
processes the psychological imperative is to retain control of the outcome
through negotiation rather than going to the arbitration phase or risk the
opening of the sealed envelope.
(b) ADR in South Africa: The status quo
If our assumption is correct — that ADR is not only compatible with, but
appropriate to, the relational contract and private ordering — then why does
South Africa lag so dramatically behind other countries in the establishment
of ADR as a default position for the resolution of disputes? We suggest that
the answer lies in a combination of factors. First, there is a lack of political will
and a hostility from many in the legal profession. Secondly, there is little
censure from judges for not attempting ADR. Finally, and until recently,
there has been a lack of available training in commercial mediation.
(i) Political will and hostility to ADR
On the first argument of a lack of political will, a predictable response is that
this cannot be the case. After all, over 40 statutes in SouthAfrica recommend
conciliation and arbitration as ways to resolve disputes.65 However, legisla-
64 Brand et al op cit note 56 at 64.
65 The Antarctic Treaties Act 60 of 1996; the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008; the
Children’s Act 38 of 2005; the Commission on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996; the
Companies Act 71 of 2008; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996;
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; the Development Facilitation Act 67 of
1995; the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006; the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of
1976; the Extension of Security Tenure Act 62 of 1997; the Financial Advisory and
Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002; the Financial Services Ombuds Scheme Act
37 of 2004; the Further Education and Training CollegesAct 16 of 2006; the GasAct
48 of 2001; the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974; the Higher Education Act 101 of
1997; the Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994; the Income Tax Act 58 of
1962; the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act 3 of 1994; the Labour Relations Act
66 of 1995; the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; the Local Govern-
ment: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003; the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000; the National Credit Act 34 of 2005; the National
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998; the National Forests Act 84 of 1998;
the National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009; the National Land Transport Transition
Act 22 of 2000; the National Payment SystemAct 78 of 1998; the National Ports Act
12 of 2005; the National Sport and Recreation Act 110 of 1998; the National Water
Act 36 of 1998; the Pan South African Language Board Act 59 of 1995; the Pension
Funds Act 24 of 1956; the Petroleum Pipelines Act 60 of 2003; the Post Office Act
44 of 1958; the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act 19 of 1998; the Probation Services Act 116 of 1991; the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; the Promotion
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tion is simply a declaration of intent.66 It does not guarantee a sustained
commitment to theADR project, to promotingADR, to training mediators,
and to funding the process. The failure of ADR to take root generally can be
seen most clearly through a comparison with the one area in whichADR has
been an acknowledged success: in the resolution of employment disputes.
Hostility toADR — by many, but not all, in the legal profession — is seen
in the track record of legislative initiatives. The Mediation in Certain
Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 provided little scope for meaningful
mediation.67 The Short Process Courts and Mediation in Certain Civil Cases
Act 103 of 1991 promised an alternative to civil litigation, but was never
implemented.68 The present pilot scheme of mediation in the magistrates’
courts started with a bold scheme for mandatory mediation with penalties for
avoiding mediation. The final draft provides for voluntary mediation with no
penalties for non-co-operation.
The 2011 version of what is now known as the ‘Voluntary Court-
Annexed Mediation Rules of the Magistrates’ Courts’ provided that while a
litigant could refuse to submit to mediation, if the court found that the refusal
was unreasonable and that mediation may have resulted in substantially the
same finding as the court, the court was empowered to make ‘such order as
to costs as it considers appropriate, against the litigant that refused mediation’.
Despite support in 2011 by the Joint High Court, Magistrates’ Courts and
ADR Committees of the Law Society of South Africa, the 2014 version of
the rules removed this opportunity to create a lively tension between a refusal
to mediate and costs. In response to this, the South African Dispute
Settlement Accreditation Council (‘DiSAC’)69 proposed that the rules
of National UnityAct 34 of 1995; the Public ProtectorAct 23 of 1994; the Recogni-
tion of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998; the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999;
the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; the Short Process Courts and Media-
tion in Certain Civil Cases Act 103 of 1991; the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998;
the SouthAfrican Institute for Drug-Free SportAct 14 of 1997; the State Information
TechnologyAgencyAct 88 of 1998; and theTelecommunicationsAct 103 of 1996.
66 As Winthrop Jordan put it, ‘while statutes usually speak falsely as to actual
behaviour, they afford probably the best single means of ascertaining what a society
thinks behaviour ought to be’ — quoted by Mark Tushnet The American Law of
Slavery 1810–1860: Considerations of Humanity and Interest (1981) 18.
67 Despite the title of the Act, what the Family Advocate is empowered to do is to
institute an enquiry, not mediate. Compare M de Jong ‘Judicial stamp of approval for
divorce and family mediation in South Africa’ (2005) 68 THRHR 95 who writes (at
96): ‘Because the purpose of an enquiry in terms of section 4 of this Act is to evaluate
the parties and the circumstances of a case in order to furnish the court with a report
and recommendation on matters concerning the welfare of any minor children, the
activities of family advocates and family counsellors should rather not be regarded as
mediation (even though they sometimes indeed try to mediate disputes between
divorcing parties).’
68 The Act remains unrepealed and is supported by Rules of Courts for Short
Process andMediation Proceedings (see GNR2196 in GG 14188 of 31 July 1992).
69 The Dispute Settlement Accreditation Council (‘DisAC’), which was estab-
lished in 2010, exists to define and publish national accreditation standards for
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should provide a clear mechanism first for reporting to the court where
parties failed or refused to participate in mediation proceedings, and,
secondly, for recording the reasons why parties refused to participate in
mediation proceedings. DiSAC argued that this would not be introducing
any new penalty or duty on the parties, but would merely serve to inform the
court on matters it already takes into account when considering costs
orders.70
The SouthAfrican Law Commission committed considerable resources in
the 1996–1997 period on several reports under its general project on ADR
(Project 94).71 Not much has come from these serious contributions,
including the compelling argument on the urgent need to bring South
African arbitration law in line with international norms. It was only on
13 April 2016 that cabinet approved the draft International Arbitration Bill
for submission to Parliament for debate and approval. After considerable
delay the Act was passed as Act 15 of 2017, and took effect on 20 December
2017.72 At the time of writing it is far too early, a few months into the
operation of theAct, to be able to assess its impact.
Turning then to the comparison with the successful system for the
resolution of employment disputes, it is helpful to consider what contributed
to the success of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitra-
tion (‘CCMA’). Few would dispute that the establishment in 1983 of the
Independent Mediation Services of South Africa (‘Imssa’) was pivotal in
transforming both public and state attitudes to mediation and arbitration.73
Initially, trade-union leaders needed convincing because private mediation
was seen as a process in which workplace power imbalances would be
transferred to an apparently legitimate forum. Slowly FOSATU and then
COSATU thawed in their attitudes to Imssa and its credibility grew. What
Imssa achieved was the privatisation of labour disputes. These disputes were
mediated and arbitrated by Imssa’s panel of mediators and arbitrators, as
opposed to the defunct conciliation board system and the sometimes
dispute-resolution practitioners, including mediators and arbitrators, as well as for
training courses, trainers and assessors. DisAC has a national mediation accreditation
standard. The standards are based on those of the InternationalMediation Institute.
70 DiSac ‘Comments on the ‘‘Court-Annexed Mediation Rules of the Magistrates’
Courts’’ ’ (22May 2013) para 2.5.
71 The 1997 Issue Paper 8 onAlternative Dispute Resolution; the 1997 Discussion
Paper 69 on a Draft International Arbitration Act for South Africa; the 1999 Discus-
sion Paper 87 on Community Dispute Resolution Structures; and the 1999 Discus-
sion Paper 83 onDomesticArbitration.
72 See GN 1454 in GG 41347 of 20December 2017.
73 In 1983, Loet Dowes Dekker, an influential industrial relations academic at the
Wits Business School, received funding for a launching conference on the establish-
ment of Imssa. This led to the training of arbitrators and mediators and soon Imssa was
functioning. Julian Riekert was appointed as the first director, followed a little later
by Charles Nupen.
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controversial industrial court.74 Imssa had a vibrant and progressive training
department, which used effective teaching methodology together with
reputable materials, training over 200 mediators and arbitrators over fifteen
years. By the 1990s, Imssa was dealing with 1500 mediations and arbitrations
annually.75
The prominence given here to Imssa’s influence is not to deny that several
other dispute resolution organisations were functioning and influential at that
time,76 but to suggest that its influence was to spill over decisively into
subsequent legislative developments. Many of the key drafters of parts of the
Constitution were Imssa panellists or key users of its services.77 The
Ministerial Task Team to draft the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’)
consisted mainly of Imssa panellists.78 The successful establishment of the
CCMA was due in large measure to adequate funding and the transfer of
mediatory and arbitral skills from Imssa panellists to CCMAcommissioners.79
The success of the CCMA can largely be attributed to considerable state
funding allowing free services to the public,80 sound and sustained training of
conciliators and arbitrators, an attempt to avoid strict legal formalities in its
relatively speedy processes, good publicity about its services (helped mainly
74 SeeAlan Rycroft (ed) The Private Regulation of Industrial Conflict: Proceedings of the
Labour Law Conference 1989 (1990).
75 Imssa tried to carry on parallel to the state-funded CCMA, which was estab-
lished in 1995. By 2000, cash-flow problems threatened Imssa’s survival due to debt-
ors not paying for Imssa’s services and a shrinking pool of international donor funding
available to non-governmental organisations in South Africa. Imssa closed in
November 2000 with a debt of R5 million, R3 million of which was owed to its
panellists for their services. In reality more and more parties — employers as well as
unions — saw little point in paying for a service which was being provided for free by
the state.
76 ADRASA (Alternative Dispute Resolution of SA), ACCORD (African Centre
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes), CCRS (Community Conflict Resolu-
tion Service), The Resolutions Board and MCC (Mediation and Conciliation Cen-
tre) all offeredmediation services.
77 For example, Tito Mboweni, Cyril Ramaphosa, Halton Cheadle, Paul Ben-
jamin, Charles Nupen, Nicholas Haysom. Geoff Budlender, as the then Director-
General of Land Affairs, was instrumental in introducing mediation as a statutory
mechanism for dealing with land disputes. At the political level, Jayendra Naidoo,
Jay Naidoo, Halton Cheadle, Nicholas Haysom, Geoff Schreiner and Johnny Cope-
lyn were instrumental in forging the concept of Peace Committees in the National
PeaceAccord. Jayendra Naidoo and Halton Cheadle conceived the Nedlac model of
social dialogue expressed in theNEDLAC statute.
78 In particular, Ray Zondo, Dhaya Pillay andAndre van Niekerk; Halton Chead-
le’s associationwith Imssa was mainly as a user of its services.
79 Charles Nupen and Thandi Orleyn, both Imssa National Directors, became
directors of the CCMA. Most Imssa panelists became CCMA commissioners and
arbitrators on bargaining councils. John Brand and Felicity Steadman, Imssa panelists,
designed the first trainingmaterials for CCMAcommissioners. Imssa panelists, such as
Sarah Christie, Sue Albertyn and Yunus Shaik played important roles in establishing
the CCMAin different provinces.
80 The Government grant in 2016 was R750 471 000: see (2015–2016) Annual
Review 133.
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by trade unions), and access by the public to 20 offices nationally.81 The
CCMA employs some 340 full-time and part-time commissioners in all
nine provinces of South Africa. During the 2015/2016 financial year,
136 959 conciliations were held. CCMA figures indicate that the average
duration of a conciliation is two hours for individual disputes. About 74 per
cent of disputes are settled at conciliation.82 By any standards these statistics
speak of an efficient and effective dispute resolution system.
A factor which is inescapable about many labour disputes is that relational
theory fits the on-going employment contract. Reinstatement as the default
remedy for unfair dismissal indicates an underlying belief that the employ-
ment contract can be restored. During the subsistence of an employment
relationship, the Labour RelationsAct and the Employment EquityAct 55 of
1998 allow claims for unfair labour practices and unfair discrimination. This
recognises that, even in a potentially conflicting relationship, conciliation
and arbitration are capable of restructuring matters to allow the contract to
continue.83
These factors do not apply to other areas of dispute resolution governed by
statute. For instance, as the national debate on access to land heats up, there
are no signs of a creative and sustainable role for mediation in terms of the
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 and the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. Similarly,
there is no national panel of environmental mediators or state funding to
promote mediation under the National Environmental Management Act
107 of 1998. There are simply no parallels to the CCMA.
A modest exception applies in the realm of tax law. From 2003, new
regulations commenced prescribing the circumstances under which tax
disputes may be settled.84 The taxpayer is given the option of referring a
81 For a general critique of the CCMA, see Paul Benjamin (2013) ‘Assessing South
Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)’
ILO Working Paper No 47 Governance and Tripartism Department, International
Labour Office, Geneva, available at http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/
publications/WCMS_210181/lang–en/index.htm, accessed on 17 March 2017.
H Bhorat, Kalie Pauw & Liberty Mncube (2009) ‘Understanding the efficiency and
effectiveness of the dispute resolution system in South Africa: An analysis of CCMA
data’ July 1, 2009 Development Policy Research Unit DPRU Working Paper No 09/137,
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184182, accessed on 17 March 2017;
John Brand ‘CCMA: Achievements and challenges — Lessons from the first three
years’ (2000) 21 ILJ 77; Hanneli Bendeman ‘An analysis of the problems of the labour
dispute resolution system in SouthAfrica’ (2006) 6 African Journal on Conflict Resolution
81, available athttp://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%ef%bf%bcan-analysis-of-the-problems-
of-the-labour-dispute-resolution-system-in-south-africa/, accessed on 20 March 2017.
82 (2015–2016) Annual Review op cit note 80 at 123.
83 Cohen 2012 Acta Juridica op cit note 13.
84 Settlement circumstances under s 107B of the Income TaxAct and s 93A of the
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 provided for in GN 467 in GG 24639 of 1 April
2003; the rules include a Code of Conduct for Facilitators. This is presently regulated
in terms of s 103(2) of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. See Rule 13 of the
Rules PromulgatedUnder Section 103 of theTaxAdministrationAct.
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matter to ADR. In 2015–2016, SARS received and dealt with 6221 dispute
cases through the ADR process; 421 dispute cases were dealt with at head
office, 5617 at regional level and 183 cases through the Tax Board process.85
(ii) Judges and ADR
In other jurisdictions, ADR has been promoted by judicial responses to a
refusal by a party to attempt mediation. In 2009, Feehily argued that it was
unlikely that commercial mediation would become a prominent form of
dispute resolution until heavy costs penalties were deployed by the courts.86
So far, this prediction has been accurate. A rare example of a judicial
expectation of mediation as a prior step to litigation is MB v NB.87 In this
case, Brassey AJ held that the failure by attorneys to send a divorce matter to
mediation resulted in many days wasted in court and in chambers, and as a
consequence, deprived the attorneys of their attorney-and-client costs.88
While only the attorneys were deprived of their costs in this case, the risk
now exists that parties who unreasonably refuse to mediate will also be
deprived of their costs.
There will often be cases where mediation is not appropriate.89 Clearly, if a
litigant articulates why it refuses to mediate, and the court accepts this
explanation, this cannot be held against it. However, where public policy
unambiguously requires the parties to engage in ADR and there are practical
issues at stake, such as the use of the courts’ resources in lengthy litigation, it is
submitted that courts increasingly should take into account a refusal to
participate inADR as a factor when awarding costs.
This needs to be more than a judge-driven evolution of dispute resolution
norms. Perhaps this is the intention of Rule 40.9 of the Law Society’s Draft
Uniform Rules, which reads: ‘A member shall advise their clients at the
earliest possible opportunity on the likely success of such clients’ cases and not
generate unnecessary work, nor involve their clients in unnecessary
expense.’ A specific reference to ADR would, of course, provide the
necessary and desirable clarity.90
(iii) Training in commercial mediation
A lack of training in commercial mediation is another possible reason for the
delay in ADR becoming normative. Starting at law schools, the curriculum
assumes that litigation is the primary method of dispute resolution: civil and
criminal procedure courses and moot court competitions create the impres-
85 Annual Report South African Revenue Service 2015–2016 (2016) 55.
86 Ronan Feehily ‘Cost sanctions: The critical instrument in the development of
commercial mediation in SouthAfrica’ (2009) 126 SALJ 291 at 311. See also Rycroft
op cit note 7 at 778–86; Feehily 2015 SALJ op cit note 7.
87 2010 (3) SA220 (GSJ).
88 Ibid paras 59–61.
89 Such as in the case of Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town &
others, In re: City of Cape Town v Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd & others [2013]
ZAWCHC60. See the reasons set out in para 27.
90 Rycroft op cit note 7 at 786.
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sion that all disputes are resolved in court. There is very little training in
negotiation and mediation skills. Then, once in practice, law graduates
discover that fees are earned not in earnest attempts to negotiate or mediate,
but in prolonging the matter until the date of the trial.
However, in the last ten years, private businesses and universities have
steadily trained commercial mediators. In some cases, the training has been
specialised: Law@Work91 has recently run several training courses for
mediators in the field of medical negligence. In addition, there are now a
number of commercial mediation service providers: Tokiso Dispute Settle-
ment (Pty) Ltd, Equillore Group,92 theAssociation ofArbitrators of Southern
Africa and theArbitration Foundation of SouthAfrica.
These initiatives recognise the need for ADR in the commercial world.
Nevertheless, the pace of transformation is sluggish. Clues as to why this is
the case may be found in a closer study of the resolution of disputes in the
construction industry.
IV DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
It is commonly understood that arbitration and litigation, and increasingly
adjudication, are the predominant forms of dispute resolution in the South
African construction industry. While Michelle Porter-Wright’s practice has
seen an increase in the number of mediations in recent years (driven largely
by the soaring costs of arbitration and litigation), mediation is less widely
adopted. This is despite mediation being particularly well-suited to construc-
tion disputes, given that they tend to arise as a result of a breakdown in
communication between parties.93
Unfortunately, there are a number of systemic hurdles to the adoption of
mediation as a mainstream format of dispute resolution in the South African
construction industry. The purpose of this section of the paper is to outline a
few of these hurdles, from Porter-Wright’s practical experience. In short,
first, there is a lack of legislative endorsement of mediation by the South
African government. (This confirms the more general argument put forward
in part III(b)(i) above.) Secondly, there is a lack of endorsement by
standard-form construction contracts. Thirdly, mediation is approached in
an inherently adversarial manner, with the mediator being relied upon for a
solution or determination to the detriment of meaningful engagement and
problem solving. Fourthly, mediation has a reputation for becoming increas-
ingly cumbersome, costly and adversarial. Finally, there is a lack of skilled
mediators with a working knowledge of construction disputes, which is
91 A training unit at the Faculty of Law,UCT. See note 9 above.
92 On its website, Equillore states that it has settled over 45 000 cases for govern-
ment and corporate clients with 85 per cent of matters being settled after the first
mediationmeeting. See http://www.equillore.com/wp/, accessed on 17March 2017.
93 Madelene de Jong ‘A pragmatic look at mediation as an alternative to divorce
litigation’2010 TSAR 515 at 522.
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coupled to a perception that mediation is not suited to complex technical
disputes of fact commonly encountered on projects.
(a) A lack of legislative endorsement in civil disputes
In continuation of the argument in part III(b)(i) above, but with specific
reference to high-value commercial disputes involving construction con-
tracts, the high courts, which deal with the complex, high-value disputes that
are often a by-product of construction projects, do not currently offer a
court-annexed mediation facility. Nonetheless, the implementation of com-
pulsory high court-annexed mediation in South Africa remains on the cards.
The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Development is aware that
compulsory court-annexed mediation is a growing trend internationally and
that the common view is that South Africa should follow suit. The
Department has asked the South African Law Reform Commission to
investigate the matter and advise on the implementation of such a system. In
2014, the ministry also mandated the investigation into the implementation
of enabling legislation and the preparation of a Bill. The Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development further appointed a Mediation Advisory
Committee which is responsible, inter alia, for assisting the Department in
investigating the possibility of implementing appropriate enabling legislation
in SouthAfrica.
To date, however, no new developments may be reported and this lack of
legitimacy remains a major hurdle to the adoption of mediation as a viable
format ofADR, both in civil and construction disputes.
(b) A lack of endorsement in CIDB-approved standard-form contracts
In the South African construction industry, the standard-form construction
contracts that are currently available, and those endorsed by the Construction
Industry Development Board (‘CIDB’), do not actively encourage the use of
mediation as a standard format for dispute resolution.
The standard contracts used most commonly are the Joint Building
Contracts Committee Principal Building Agreement (‘JBCC PBA’), the
South African Institution of Civil Engineering General Conditions of
Contract (‘GCC’), and the International Federation of Consulting Engineers
(‘FIDIC’) and Institution of Civil Engineers New Engineering Contract
(‘NEC’) suites of contracts.94 While these contracts render it mandatory to
take disputes that cannot be settled by the employer’s agent to arbitration,
only an outdated version of the GCC (the 1999 contract) stipulates that
disputes must go to mediation. Unfortunately, the subsequent 2004 GCC
contract eliminated mediation as a necessary step and introduced adjudica-
tion as a compulsory default instead. In the 2010 edition, the default
mechanism is amicable settlement with the assistance of an impartial third
94 See generally PA Ramsden McKenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts
and Arbitration 7 ed (2014).
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party called the neutral.95 In the JBCC PBA 2014, mediation is listed as
optional, applicable only if both parties agree. Further, in both the FIDIC
1999 suite, as well as in the NEC suites, no formal mediation clauses are
applicable, whether mandatory or optional.
The lack of contractually endorsed mediation options in these four
standard-form contracts is perhaps not surprising given that they are
fundamentally liability driven, and not collaborative, styles of contract. In
short, these contracts generally reflect the traditional format of construction
procurement, which is characterised by a split between design, on the one
hand, and construction, on the other hand.96 The result is that the contractor
is excluded from the design development process. However, such separation
is a notorious driver of disputes. The industry would be well advised to move
toward more collaborative styles of contract, such as the PPC2000 suite,
which represents a fundamental shift in approach to construction procure-
ment, and which is currently enjoying success in the United Kingdom.97
We suggest that a move towards more collaborative styles of contract, and the
problem-solving that typically characterises them, will more naturally
accommodate mediation as a format of dispute resolution.
As an ancillary point, there is also a marked misunderstanding of mediation
in South Africa. While adjudication, expert determination, arbitration and
litigation are binding procedures, mediation is not. Significantly, since
mediation is not binding, the parties retain an attractive level of flexibility
over the scope, amount and details of the resolution of the dispute. This
crucial point is still not properly understood in the construction industry.
(c) The adversarial mindset
Porter-Wright’s practice generally deals with a particular type of dispute,
namely high-value construction and related disputes, such as warrant
95 The SAICE Management Guide to the General Conditions of Contract 2010 (2010)
states that it is recommended that the ‘GCC 2010Amicable Settlement Procedures’ at
page 163 of the Management Guide be used in order to provide structure to the dispute
resolution process; namely negotiation, mediation, conciliation, mini-trial and expert
evidence. The contract, however, makes no express reference to the GCC
2010 Amicable Settlement Procedures. The SAICE Management Guide incorporating
the Amicable Settlement Procedures is available from SAICE directly. See www.saice-
.org.za, accessed on 19 June 2017.
96 While the NEC is a more collaborative contract form,Wright views the NEC as
being a fundamentally traditional and liability driven contract. Her reasons for this
view fall beyond the scope of this article. For discussion of collaboration under the
NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract, see Terry Boxall, Andrew Hutchison &
Michelle Wright ‘NEC3ECC Clause 10.1: An enforceable contractual duty of trust
and cooperation in the construction industry?’ (2017) 28 Stellenbosch LR 97.
97 See http://www.ppc2000.co.uk/, accessed on 12 June 2017. In short, PPC2000
moves away from the traditional split between design and build, and integrates the
design, supply and construction processes, from inception to completion, by setting
up an ‘integrated team’, and providing a practical basis for all the key players to work
together, according to agreed timetables, from early design right through to commis-
sioning and handover.
PRIVATE ORDERING AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 345
external legal representation. This, we admit, may have influenced the
argument advanced here. Nonetheless, in Porter-Wright’s experience, medi-
ators in these sorts of disputes are appointed repetitively from a relatively
small pool of lawyers; generally advocates who have obtained senior counsel
status.
Naturally, lawyers are schooled in adversarial styles of civil litigation. As
such, and where lawyers preside as mediators (or where lawyers make
submissions on behalf of parties at a mediation), the result is a discernible lack
of engagement between the parties, who habitually rely on the mediator to
problem-solve by way of suggestion or determination. Further, the lawyer/
mediator tends to use persuasion as a means of bringing the parties closer
together, which perpetuates an adversarial mindset. In Porter-Wright’s
opinion, mediations which are championed by lawyers often degenerate into
hostile and unhelpful engagements. As a result, she often advises clients to
minimise lawyer representation.
It is interesting, then, that a lack of problem solving during the mediation
process has been found in an empirical study to be a pervasive characteristic
of construction mediations in South Africa. In their study, Povey, Cattell &
Michell observed that the majority of available mediation time was allocated
to gathering information on a dispute (43 per cent) and drafting the final
determination or agreement (27 per cent).98 In considering the role of
problem solving during that study, it was significant that when asked how
negotiation/bargaining took place, 58 per cent of the respondents stated that
no solution-seeking discussions took place at all.99 Rather, once the informa-
tion on the dispute had been obtained, the onus was placed on the mediator
to suggest or submit an opinion or decision, without any further involve-
ment from the parties.100
A related practice which drives adversarial behaviours during mediation,
and which in our view is not to be encouraged, is the tendency of parties to
agree to binding, but not final, determinations from the mediator once
proceedings are completed. In this way, the mediation transforms into an
adjudication or expert determination, with the decision binding the parties
temporarily, pending the outcome of arbitration or litigation. The obvious
shortcoming with such a procedure is the mediator’s insight into the
weaknesses of the parties’ cases, which will be highlighted to the mediator as
part of the parties’ respective negotiation strategies, given the ‘without
prejudice’ nature of the mediation. Where a determination is sought in this
manner, our perception is that the parties are inherently guarded in their
respective positions and are discouraged from pursuing a settlement.
The stage at which the dispute is mediated also has a bearing on the
98 Althea Povey, Keith Cattell & Kathy Michell ‘Mediation practice in the South
African construction industry: The influence of culture, the legislative environment,
and the professional institutions’ (2005) 21 Negotiation Journal 481 at 487–8.
99 Ibid at 489.
100 Ibid.
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procedure’s likely success. Mediations work better where the employer has a
vested interest in completing the project and maintaining the working
relationship with the contractor. Where disputes arise after the contractor has
demobilised or the contractual relationship is terminated, the parties, and the
employer in particular, have less interest in engaging one another meaning-
fully. As such, the industry would do well from the increased use of
mediation as a project-management tool.
(d) Protracted, costly and adversarial
In the mediations with which Porter-Wright’s practice is involved, the
procedures adopted can become process driven, on account of requirements
of the mediator and/or the parties’ lawyers. The mediation can often become
blurred with more adversarial, process driven forms of dispute resolution,
such as adjudication or expert determination.101 For example, the parties
almost always exchange ‘pleadings’ (sometimes called ‘position papers’ or
‘statement of issues’) in an attempt to crystallise issues in advance of the
mediation. To compensate for a lack of a formal disclosure or discovery
process, the parties often request documents from one another in advance of
proceedings and in factually intensive disputes; it is not uncommon for a
mediator to call for detailed chronologies of events, coupled to bundles of
extensive supporting documentation. At the mediation itself, the parties’
respective lawyers often make opening submissions, akin to those seen in
arbitration or motion court. Further, it is not unheard of for mediations to
run for many months, even years. These procedures tend to hike the costs
associated with mediation, and decrease its efficacy and popularity.
(e) Lack of skilled mediators
The identity of the mediator is the single largest determinant of the outcome
of the mediation. In order to mediate most effectively a construction matter,
the mediator must be able to convince the parties of their risk, both with
regard to the outcome at a hearing and with regard to the costs associated
with preparing for, and pursuing, the matter. A mediator must be well
prepared on the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case and must push
the parties to reflect on the risks of further litigation. A proper analysis of the
risks involved is a fundamental component of a successful mediation. It is
often said that a good mediator tells each party how bad their case is until they
decide to settle.
Further, parties to a construction dispute are unlikely to be swayed by the
mediator’s evaluation of the risks involved if the mediator is not well versed
in construction disputes, which are hugely specialised endeavours. Relative
ignorance of common industry parlance, such as RFI (‘Request for Informa-
101 Jacques Joubert ‘Judicial activism essential to kick-start mediation’ (2014) 14
Without Prejudice 42.
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tion’),102 prolongation costs,103 critical path schedules,104 change orders,105
shop drawings106 and the like, will cause experienced construction profes-
sionals to question the quality of the mediator’s risk assessment and reduce
the likelihood of a settlement. Furthermore, the mediator should have
experience actually presiding over construction disputes. Only an individual
who has the requisite experience can credibly evaluate the risks associated
with pursuing a construction claim.
There is no substitute for knowledge and experience when it comes to
selecting an effective construction mediator. These skills are in critically short
supply in SouthAfrica and this is a major reason for the general reluctance by
parties to mediate. As the South African market matures and more lawyers
specialise in this area, the situation ought to improve. In addition, the
industry is well advised to focus on the standards of training, accreditation
and education of mediators.107
Often, a related concern is the suitability of mediations for the resolution
of complex technical issues. It is a perception that mediators (especially
non-construction professionals) are simply unable to cut through the parties’
often wildly differing views on the applicable technical positions and the
parties lose faith in the likelihood of a reasonable settlement.
The picture that emerges from this law-in-action account is that the ideals
of relational/private-ordering theory are not fully reflected in the actual state
of dispute resolution in the South African construction industry. Indeed, as
we saw in part III(b) above, this is in fact just a micro-snapshot of a much
bigger commercial sector picture.
What can we learn from this disconnect from a theory point of view, and
how should we refine our theory to reflect better law and practice in the field
of dispute resolution in South Africa? Thus far, we have suggested several
practical answers to the question of how to further ADR implementation. In
part V, we turn to a final summative conclusion, which will link the theory,
the law and practice.
V CONCLUSION
So why is it then that despite the legal, political, economic and practical
obstacles thrown up in parts III and IV above, we still think thatADR is often
102 RFI is a question to another stakeholder of the project asking for more informa-
tion, clarifications, additional details or anything else that is not clear in any other
document (such as, for example, the design drawing, specifications or standards).
103 Prolongation claims are claims for additional time-related costs ordinarily asso-
ciated with delays caused by the employer.
104 In project management, a critical path is the sequence of project activities which
amounts to the longest overall duration. This determines the shortest time possible to
complete the project.
105 A change order is work that is added to or deleted from the original scope of
work of a contract, which alters the original contract value and/or completion date.
106 A shop drawing is a detailed construction and fabrication drawing that shows the
proposedmaterial, shape, size and assembly of the parts.
107 Feehily 2015 SALJ op cit note 86 at 379.
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the appropriate form of commercial dispute resolution? A focus on inter-
personal relationships and the role that these play in business may appear a bit
‘touchy-feely’ to many hard-nosed commercial litigators.At the same time, it
is an incontrovertible truth that a successful business requires not only
financial capital, but also human and social capital, to succeed. The
importance of human agency, even in blue-chip dealings between juristic
persons, cannot be denied; nor can the role of a business person’s personal
network of clients, associates and contacts. Viewed in this light, a business
relationship goes beyond personal trust and loyalty — it has quantifiable
monetary value. This type of contextual analysis, typical of relational contract
theory, would of course be at the forefront of any form of reality checking
which a commercial mediator or other ADR agent would pose to parties in
conflict: what are the anticipated costs of a protracted court battle in money,
time and social and human capital, and is there a more economically efficient
alternative?
Of course, even the most idealistic and communitarian ADR advocate
must acknowledge that ADR is not always appropriate or even efficient. In
part III above, we discussed the typical checklists that a party should go
through in deciding whether to choose ADR, and if so, the form thereof. In
addition to mediation, there are several variants, hybrids and alternatives to
choose from. Our aim has been to highlight the procedural advantages of
ADR from a relational point of view. Upon entering the realm of reality,
however, we saw that there is a disconnect between the ideals of economic
and contract theory as set out in part II and the nature of the South African
dispute resolution environment and industry. Although there is extensive
evidence of legislative intent to move towards an ADR regime, this has not
yet been fully implemented. There is also a lack of support for ADR amongst
the South African legal fraternity — lawyers tend to steer clients towards
litigation, and judges do not usually penalise them for this. The major
exception to this trend is in the realm of employment disputes, where the
CCMA has enjoyed considerable success.
In the construction industry, which is a highly relational context given the
long-term nature of construction projects and the presence of repeat players
in the market, we saw that ADR tends to take more adversarial forms, such as
adjudication or arbitration, rather than mediation. The major obstacles here
are established industry norms, such as the prevalence of an adversarial
mindset amongst parties, as well as a lack of an enabling legal environment,
where standard form contracts do not provide for mediation. We also saw
that there are high barriers to entry as an ADR practitioner in this industry,
since specific, detailed knowledge of construction practice is required to
sustain legitimacy in the eyes of disputing parties. This legitimacy issue is not
an insurmountable obstacle. However, it does favour a certain type of dispute
resolution agent, particularly senior litigation practitioners rather than
specialist mediators.
This brings us to an important part of our argument, namely that there is a
need in South Africa for specifically trained mediators, and particularly
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mediators with inside knowledge of law and commercial practice. In some
industries, such as the construction industry as we highlighted in part IV, a
mediator does not just need to be well versed in legal and ADR theory and
procedure, but also needs to be a construction-industry insider.
As discussed in part III above, there is a growing availability of mediator
training courses, including some which embed this type of knowledge in
legal education curricula. For an ADR regime to catch on, particularly in the
form of mediation, a new batch of dispute resolution agents is needed with
the necessary training and experience to capitalise on the trend towards
ADR. Moreover, if there is an economic demand for a certain type of
professional, it is our belief that the market will provide for the training and
supply of such persons. We hope that our argument here, addressed to the
legal fraternity, particularly legal academics and practitioners, will be a spur in
this direction.
It is possible for private ordering to be determinative in resolving disputes.
There is ample empirical evidence to support this argument. However, the
available literature tends to focus on homogenous communities or specific
industries. An ADR culture in South Africa requires a diverse and heteroge-
neous population of South African commercial parties and their legal
practitioners to accept ADR as a better way of resolving disputes. Relational
contract theory is observable everywhere in business practice, but has had
little impact on business law. This is because relationships tend to be
destroyed by litigation, the realm of law and lawyers. Private ordering keeps
disputes in the relational regime and out of the courts. We hope that the
importance of ADR will be recognised in South Africa amongst those who
value social capital as a source of business revenue.
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